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RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS - TITLE TO CHURCH PROPERTY IN EvENT OF A SCHISM WITHIN A CHURCH - In 1839 property was
granted to the "Trustees of the Church of Christ of Little Grove and their
successors in office ••• unto the only proper use and behoof of the Church of
Christ at Little Grove during a succession of trustees." A dispute arose within
the congregation, causing a schism, and both the plaintiffs and the defendants

1941]

RECENT DECISIONS

claimed that they were the successors to the original trustees and that they
had carried on the tenets and doctrines of the Church of Christ. The evidence
showed that the defendants had been elected trustees at an open meeting presided over by a regular minister of the church, whereas the plaintiffs had been
elected by a small group at a private home. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
defendants individually and as trustees of the church from assuming ownership,
control and use of the property in question. Held, injunction refused on the
ground that when members of a religious congregation divide and one faction
breaks away and forms a new organization, the title to the property remains in
that part of the congregation which adheres to the tenets and doctrines originally taught by the congregation to whose use the property was dedicated. Little
Grove Church v. Todd, 373 Ill. 387, 26 N. E. (2d) 485 (1940).
It has long been held that unless civil or property rights are involved, courts
will not pass on any differences between contending factions of a church.1
Where property rights are involved, such disputes will usually fall into one of
three categories: (I) where the property or fund is devoted by the express terms
of the grant to the formation of a trust to support some specific religious doctrine or belief or was acquired to be used for the religious purposes of the
society; (2) where there is no express trust stipulated in the grant and the
society owning the property is congregational in form, entirely independent of
any outside organization; and (3) where no express trust is stipulated and the
society owning the property is one of a number united to form a more general
body of churches with ecclesiastical control over the societies of which it is
composed. 2 When a case comes within the first category, regardless of the type
of church organization involved, the courts will usually uphold the trust, basing
their decisions both on the desire to carry out the settlor's intent and on the
broad policy arguments which underlie charitable trusts. All the courts seem to
agree that in such cases the faction which adheres to some former set of tenets
and doctrines of the church is the one entitled to the property. But while many
courts look back to the doctrines taught when the property was acquired,8 others
refuse to look beyond those generally accepted when the dispute arose.4 In
i Stallings v. Finney, 287 Ill. 145, 122 N. E. 369 (1919); White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends, 89 Ind. 136
(1883); Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 777, 44 N. E. 363 (1896). In
Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S. W. 805 (1909), the reason given for the rule
was that civil courts had nothing to do with the subject matter of religious decrees
which did not involve civil or property rights.
2
Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 679 (1871).
3
Apostolic Holiness Union of Post Falls v. Knudson, 21 Idaho 589, 123 P.
473 (1912); Christian Church of Sand Creek v. Church of Christ, 219 Ill. 503, 76
N. E. 703 (1906); White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends v. White Lick Quarterly
Meeting of Friends, 89 Ind. 136 (1883); True Reformed Dutch Church of Paramus
v. Iserman, 64 N. J. L. 506, 45 A. 771 (1900); Peace v. First Christian Church, 20
Tex. Civ. App. 85, 48 S. W. 534 (1898).
4
Schnoor's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 138 (1870); Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613,
121 S. W. 805 (1909); Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic All Saints Church v.
Kedrovsky, 113 Conn. 696, 156 A. 688 (1931); Bose v. Christ, 193 Pa. St. 13, 44
A. 240 (1899).
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particular cases this difference in approach might easily alter the disposition of
the property. 5 Furthermore, from the standpoint of procedure and proof, courts
have often found it difficult to determine which faction is following the correct
"set of doctrines." Above and beyond these difficulties is the original problem
of ascertaining whether a trust was in fact created; for if none was created the
courts should be slow to restrain the organization either from changing its
religious views or from disposing of its property without hindrance. Within
the second category, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined
that all controversies should be settled by a majority of the congregation in
accordance with the rules of the society.6 In the third category, the same court
has further decided that the established tribunals of the general group of churches
should decide all questions of faith, doctrine and custom; and these decisions
should be conclusive upon the civil courts in their judgments as to property
rights. 7 Thus only in cases falling within the first category should the civil
courts take upon themselves the burden of determining which faction should
receive title to the church property. In the principal case, the testator clearly
showed his intent to leave his property solely for the use of the Church of Christ,
and the court undoubtedly applied the correct rule. 8

5 It would be conceivable that the generally accepted tenets and doctrines could
change greatly from the time the property was received up to the time of the dispute;
and thus if we follow the second rule, a faction which was following the original tenets
and doctrines for which the property was to be used would be defeated.
6 Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 679 at 725 (1871).
7ld., 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 679 at 727.
8 Two English cases decided in the early part of the nineteenth century first
brought the rule of the principal case into wide circulation. They were Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, 3 Merivale 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (1817), and
Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh 529, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820).

